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APPELLATE JUDGES AS GATEKEEPERS?
AN INVESTIGATION OF THRESHOLD DECISIONS
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

Erin B. Kaheny*
I. INTRODUCTION

Although litigants may take their claims to court, full
merits consideration of those claims may or may not be
provided. Judges, for example, might find that a litigant lacks
standing to sue or that a claim was presented too early or too late
for adjudication. They might conclude that the litigant failed to
exhaust administrative remedies prior to seeking judicial
resolution of a legal question or that the court lacks jurisdiction
to decide the matter. These and other similar decisions are based
on a group of threshold rules that are frequently raised in
litigation which, when applied, might lead a judge to forego
reaching the merits of a claim. Thus, when judges apply such
threshold rules, they are aptly described as "gatekeepers.'
Because of the significance of threshold rules, it is
unsurprising that judicial scholars have explored their use in
some detail, and they have done so especially with respect to the
Supreme Court. 2 Yet relatively few scholars have acknowledged
* University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Department of Political Science. Professor Kaheny
can be reached via e-mail at ekaheny@uwm.edu.
1. Erin B. Kaheny, The Nature of CircuitCourt Gatekeeping Decisions, 44 L. & Socy.

Rev. 129, 130 (2010) (citing Sheldon Goldman & Thomas P. Jahnige, The Federal Courts
as a PoliticalSystem 114 (Harper & Row 1971)).
2. E.g. Burton Atkins & William Taggart, Substantive Access Doctrines and Conflict
Management in the U.S. Supreme Court: Reflections on Activism and Restraint, in Supreme
Court Activism and Restraint 351-83 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb eds.,
Lexington Books 1982); Karen Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group Conflict in the

Federal Courts, 70 Am. Political Sci. Rev. 723 (1976); Gregory J. Rathjen & Harold J.
Spaeth, Denial of Access and Ideological Preferences:An Analysis of the Voting Behavior
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and analyzed the threshold decisions made by the judges of the
federal courts of appeals. 3
But there is something very revealing about these sorts of
rulings in the federal courts of appeals, which makes this
situation all the more notable. After all, as Professor Cross
describes, these procedural rules provide judges with discretion.
This fact alone makes a study of threshold decisions in the
federal courts of appeals potentially worthwhile given how their
dockets are marked by their non-discretionary nature. That is,
federal appellate judges' interpretations of threshold rules might
lead them to forego making decisions on appellate claims even if
they might otherwise have no discretion to decline to hear
particular cases.5 In addition, while it is impossible to disagree
with the argument that federal district judges play an important
role as gatekeepers via the application of threshold rules, 6 their
decisions pertaining to threshold matters are obviously subject to
appeal.7

This paper represents an effort to further explore this
dimension of gatekeeping in the federal courts of appeals by
providing a descriptive analysis of their threshold decisions over
a substantial period of time. Employing the sample data

of the Burger CourtJustices, 1969-1976, 36 W. Political Q. 71 (1983); Gregory J. Rathjen
& Harold J. Spaeth, Access to the Federal Courts: An Analysis of Burger Court Policy

Making, 23 Am. J. Political Sci. 360 (1979) [hereinafter Rathjen & Spaeth, Access to the
Federal Courts]; Mark Silverstein & Benjamin Ginsberg, The Supreme Court and the New

Politics of Judicial Power, 102 Political Sci.

Q.

371 (1987); William A. Taggart &

Matthew R. DeZee, A Note on Substantive Access Doctrinesin the U.S. Supreme Court: A
Comparative Analysis of the Warren and Burger Courts, 38 W. Political Q. 84 (1985);
Stephen L. Washy, The Supreme Court in the FederalJudicial System 121-244 (2d ed.,
Holt, Rinehart & Winston 1984); Stephen L. Wasby, Continuity and Change: From the
Warren Court to the Burger Court 31-54 (Goodyear Publg. Co. 1976).
3. See e.g. Frank Cross, Decision Making in the US. Courts of Appeals 178-200

(Stanford U. Press 2007); Kaheny, supra n. 1; Erin B. Kaheny & Kimberly J. Rice,
Threshold Rules as Tools of Deference?: Circuit Judge Gatekeeping in Administrative

Agency Cases, 31 Just. Sys. J. 201 (2010); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or
Politics?77 N.C. L. Rev. 1741 (1999).
4. Cross, supra n. 3, at 180-81.
5. Kaheny, supra n. 1, at 131.
6. Goldman & Jahnige, supra n. 1, at 114; see also C.K. Rowland & Bridget Jeffery
Todd, Where You Stand Depends on Who Sits: Platform Promises and Judicial
Gatekeeping in the FederalDistrict Courts, 53 J. Pol. 175, 177 (1991) (stating that "[m]ost

gatekeeping decisions are made by trial judges").
7. Kaheny, supra n. 1, at 131; Kaheny & Rice supra n. 3, at 205.
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available in the United States Courts of Appeals Database,8 I
investigate the frequency with which the federal courts of
appeals consider cases raising threshold issues and examine
whether the circuits seem to vary in their threshold behavior.
Moreover, comparisons are drawn between Democratic and
Republican appointees to the federal apellate bench and among
"presidential appointment cohorts" to determine whether
presidents have selected federal appeals court judges whose
voting behavior varies systematically on questions of judicial
access and, if so, whether such tendencies are more pronounced
in certain types of litigant contests and/or with respect to certain
types of threshold issues.
II. BACKGROUND
Judicial scholars have recognized the importance of
threshold rules, given the implications such rules have on
litigant access to the judiciary.' 0 Review of the relevant
literature suggests emphasis on the Supreme Court's procedural
gatekeeping-investigating both the frequency with which the
Court considers threshold questions and whether such decisions
serve to restrict or enhance access." The resulting analyses are
suggestive of at least some differences in the consideration and
treatment of these issues across select Su reme Court regimes
(i.e., Warren versus Burger Court eras) and also point to
multiple sources of influence in the gatekeeping behavior of
individual justices.' 3 In addition, among the insights generated
by this line of research is the basic notion that a justice's

8. See Donald R. Songer, The United States Courts ofAppeals Database(NSF# SES-

89-12678). This database, which covers 1925-96, can be downloaded from the Judicial
Research Initiative (JuRI) site at the University of South Carolina, http://www.cas.sc
.edu/poli/juri/ (click "Databases," then click "United States Courts of Appeals Databases")
(accessed Sept. 13, 2011; copy of main page on file with Journal of Appellate Practice and
Process) [hereinafter "Original Courts of Appeals Database"].
9. See Rowland & Todd, supra n. 6, at 178.
10. Taggart & DeZee, supra n. 2, at 84.
11. See e.g. Atkins & Taggart, supra n. 2; Taggart & DeZee, supra n. 2.
12. See Taggart & DeZee, supra n. 2. But see Atkins & Taggart, supra n. 2, at 378
(arguing that "aggregate data do not suggest any dramatic departure in the pattern of access
decisions after 1969").
13. Rathjen & Spaeth, Access to the FederalCourts, supra n. 2, at 374-81.
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preferences pertaining to the merits of a case can influence how

the justice construes threshold rules.14
Of course, another important area of research involves an
exploration of gatekeeping practices at the first rung of the
judicial ladder-the federal district courts. Of particular note in
this respect is a study that found support for the proposition that
district judge decisions to grant standing might have their roots
in the policy preferences of those who appointed the judges to
the federal bench.1 5 Certainly, this analysis of Reagan
appointees to the federal district court bench was suggestive of
the point, with such judges being more inclined to limit standing
in cases in which underdog litigants were challenging
upperdogs.16 More flexible standing decisions for underdogs
were provided, unsurprisingly, by Carter appointees but, as the
authors note, such decisions were contingent upon the nature of
the claims pursued.' 7
Surprisingly, little systematic research has focused on the
threshold decisions of courts of appeals judges. That which has
been conducted, however, does suggest the significance of these
decisions in this venue as well. Indeed, Professor Cross has
noted that threshold issues appear with some frequency in the
courts of appeals.' 8 In addition, he reported modest support for
the proposition that such decisions, even at this level, are related
to judicial ideology.19 This latter finding certainly supports the
findings of an earlier study by Professor Pierce involving a more
limited sample of standing decisions in environmental cases
before the federal courts of appeals, which described notable
differences in the gatekeeping behavior of judges appointed by
Republican and Democratic presidents, with the former more
likely to restrict standing. 20 Moreover, recent work modeling the
likelihood of a federal appellate judge granting a pro-access vote

14. See generally id.

15. Rowland & Todd, supra n. 6.
16. Id. at 181.
17. Id. at 183.
18. Cross, supra n. 3 at 187 (citing the presence of such issues in the sample of cases
comprising the Original Courts of Appeals Database); see also Kaheny, supra n. 1, at 131.
19. Cross, supra n. 3, at 191.
20. Pierce, supra n. 3, at 1744.
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also suggests "that both ideological considerations and litigant
status may play a role in" these decisions. 1
While a few scholars have recognized that federal
appellate judges render their fair share of threshold decisions
and, while there is some evidence that such decisions have a
partisan or ideological nature, a basic study of the extent of this
role is noticeably lacking in the literature. Few scholars, for
example, have sought to investigate whether the circuits vary in
the extent to which they consider threshold questions and in
terms of their overall access behavior. These trends alone,
however, might yield substantively important patterns.
Similarly, extension of the work already conducted in the federal
district courtS22 to the appellate context might also yield
valuable information regarding the political nature of threshold
decisions in the federal courts of appeals and, specifically, the
ability of presidents to achieve policy goals pertaining to judicial
access via their appointments to the federal courts of appeals.
The purpose of the present study is to address these descriptive
voids.
III. DATA AND METHODS

For the purposes of analyzing the extent and partisan nature
of threshold decisions in the federal courts of appeals, I turn to
the Original Courts of Appeals Database, which includes a
sample of published opinions. 23 Cases raising a jurisdictional
challenge or questions pertaining to the statement of a proper
claim, standing, exhaustion, statutes of limitations, and the
payment of fees are identified in the sample. In addition, cases
involving determinations as to whether a party is immune from
suit or whether a claim is ripe or moot, involves a possible
political question, is frivolous, or raises a miscellaneous
threshold concern are denoted in the dataset, which also

21. Kaheny & Rice, supra n. 3, at 201, 220; see also Kaheny, supra n. 1, at 150.
22. See Rowland & Todd, supra n. 6.
23. The Database entails fifteen opinions for each circuit-year through 1960 and thirty
opinions for each circuit-year thereafter. See Original Courts of Appeals Database, supra n.
8. The reader should note that the Original Courts of Appeals Database was also used by
Professor Cross. See generally Cross, supra n. 3.
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indicates the pro- or anti-access directionality of the associated
decision pertaining to the threshold question.2 4
Utilizing this source of data, I first compute the percentage
of cases in each circuit that raise threshold issues and then
proceed to compute the percentage of pro-access decisions by
circuit. For the purposes of this study, I define all threshold
votes in which the court (or a judge) finds that a threshold bar
does not restrict consideration of the merits of an appeal to be a
pro-access decision. Similarly, if the court (or judge) finds that a
threshold issue should not have barred the district court's
consideration of the merits, the decision (or judge's vote) is
coded as a pro-access decision. For example, a finding that an
appeal was not frivolous would be coded as a pro-access vote, as
would a finding that a standing or ripeness barrier should not
have curtailed a district court decision on the merits.
The analyses of the frequency of threshold decisions on
each circuit's docket and the percentage of pro-access decisions
in each circuit (in terms of majority outcomes) are conducted
across five time periods delineating various Supreme Court eras
and across all threshold issues coded in the Original Courts of
Appeals Database. For this purpose, the first time period (1954
to 1961) corresponds to the early Warren Court era, while the
second period (1962 to 1968) includes the later Warren Court
years. The third (1969 to 1971) and fourth (1972 to 1985) time
periods split the Burger Court, and the final period of the study,
covering the early Rehnquist Court, includes the years 1986 to
1996,25 the end date being the last year of data available in the
Original Courts of Appeals Database.
Subsequent analyses move beyond an investigation of caselevel outcomes on threshold questions to an investigation of
individual judge threshold votes, with specific attention to
partisan-based sources of influence on those votes. Specifically,
comparisons are made in the gatekeeping behavior of judges
appointed by Republican and Democratic presidents. Moreover,
24. Original Courts of Appeals Database, Documentation for Phase 1, at 118-25, http:
//www.cas.sc.edulpoli/juri/cta96_codebook.pdf (accessed Sept. 13, 2011; copy on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process) [hereinafter "Original Courts of Appeals
Database Documentation"].
25. These results are confined to approximately the first half of the Rehnquist Court.
The trends noted in this discussion or elsewhere in this article may not be characteristic of
the Rehnquist Court's later period.
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based on previous research in the federal district courts, 26 the
likelihood of a judge voting to grant access (i.e., to issue a proaccess threshold decision) is modeled as a function of the
judge's appointing president in order to determine if larger
differences among2 udicial appointees are apparent in the courts
of appeals as well.
Individual judge votes with respect to threshold decisions
were drawn from the Original Courts of Appeals Database and,
for this analysis, were limited to those rendered in regular threejudge panels. Because the convention of the database is to code
the majority (not individual judge) ruling for the threshold
questions coded in the sample, additional review had to be
undertaken for any case including a dissent. Based on this
review, I coded the dissenting judge's vote on the threshold
question to be opposite to that of the majority when the judge
clearly took issue with the majority's decision on the threshold
issue or when this interpretation could be fairly implied.
Based on a review of an earlier analysis of Supreme Court
procedural decisions, I opted to analyze, when possible, the
"proper party" and "proper forum" threshold decisions of
various appointment and partisan cohorts included in the appeals
court sample.2 8 Unlike the authors of that earlier analysis,
however, I consider potential jurisdictional bars as "proper
forum" issues. Specifically, threshold challenges relating to
jurisdiction are combined with those concerning exhaustion,
immunity, and the doctrine of political questions for analyses of
"proper forum" votes. Threshold challenges as to whether a

26. See Rowland & Todd, supra n. 6.
27. Information about appointing presidents was obtained via Gary Zuk, Deborah J.
Barrow, & Gerard S. Gryski, The Multi-User Databaseon the Attributes of United States
Appeals Court Judges (1801-2000) (NSF# SBR-93-11999), http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/

icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/6796/detail (accessed Sept. 13, 2011; copy of main page on file
with Journal of Appellate Practice and Process), and Federal Judicial Center, History of the
FederalJudiciary-BiographicalDirectory of FederalJudges, http://www.fjc.gov/history

/home.nsf/page/judges.html (accessed Sept. 13, 2011; copy of main page on file with
Journal of Appellate Practice and Process).
28. See Taggart & DeZee, supra n. 2, at 85. In their analysis, Taggart and DeZee
utilized these two subcategories along with a category devoted to jurisdictional issues.
While exact matching was not possible, I include those threshold issues coded in the
Original Courts of Appeals Database as either a "proper party" or "proper forum" issue
pursuant to the definitions of these categories provided by Taggart and DeZee. See id
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given claim is ripe for adjudication29 or is moot, along with
those probing whether a litigant has standing to sue, or has
stated a proper claim, and challenges coded under the
subcategory of "timely" in the Original Courts of Appeals
Database3 0 are designated as "proper party" cases. 3 1
Given that earlier work on district judges' decisions about
standing indicates that behavioral characteristics of presidential
appointment cohorts might hinge on the kinds of parties
challenging one another,3 I apply the framework utilized in that
study in my analysis of appellate judge threshold behavior.
Specifically, I assess cohort or "appointment effects" 33
separately for "upperdog"-versus-"upperdog" cases (i.e.,
upperdog confronts the threshold challenge) and for
"underdog"-versus-"upperdog" cases (i.e., underdog confronts
the threshold challenge).34 Unlike the earlier study, which was
limited to votes on standing,3 5 examination of a variety of
procedural threshold decisions in the courts of appeals also
permits an analysis of cohorts in situations in which upperdogs
confront underdogs and face a procedural challenge. 36
Because researchers usually assume that the upper hand
belongs to the government or businesses when they sue typical
individuals,37 I consider the former as upperdog parties and the
latter as underdogs. Groups and those coded under the
"miscellaneous" and "not ascertained" party-type cate ories in
the Original Courts of Appeals Database are omitted.
29. Ripeness challenges are not differentiated from exhaustion challenges in the
Original Courts of Appeals Database, see Original Courts of Appeals Database
Documentation, supra n. 23, at 120, and, thus, ripeness challenges were identified by the
author after review of these cases.
30. Id. at 121.
31. Taggart & DeZee, supra n. 2, at 85.
32. Rowland & Todd, supra n. 6, at 180.
33. Id at 179.
34. Id. at 178-79.
35. Id. at 177.
36. As in the Rowland and Todd study, see id. at 179, there were not enough votes in
my sample to model underdog v. underdog challenges.
37. Donald R. Songer & Reginald S. Sheehan, Who Wins on Appeal? Upperdogs and
Underdogs on the United States Courts ofAppeals, 36 Am. J. Political Sci. 235, 239 (1992)
(citing Stanton Wheeler et al., Do the 'Haves' Come Out Ahead? Winning and Losing in
State Supreme Courts, 1870-1970, 21 L. & Socy. Rev. 403 (1987)).
38. Original Courts of Appeals Database Documentation, supra n. 24, at 40.
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IV. RESULTS
A. Considerationof ThresholdIssues
As noted above, few have studied the amount of attention
given by federal appellate judges to threshold rules in the
appeals that reach their courts.40 Professor Cross, however,
provided some descriptive information when reporting that
about ten percent of the Original Courts of Appeals Database
sample entails threshold inquiries. 4 ' Moreover, his examination
of figures for each sample-year led him to conclude that "the
frequency of threshold issues in general has not varied much
over time. ,,42 My own earlier work also included some
descriptive information across various Supreme Court regimes
to highlight the presence of these issues on the dockets of the
federal courts of appeals.4 3
While this information is certainly useful, we are still left
with key questions on the descriptive front. First, are some
circuits more likely than others to consider threshold questions?
And, secondly, is there any other form of variation in the
consideration of threshold issues across the circuits that can be
discerned? Given the likely interest with respect to both
questions, Table 1, which appears on the following page,
presents the percentages of sample cases in the Original Courts
39. See Songer & Sheehan, supra n. 37, at 238 (justifying such an omission). Rowland
and Todd coded "corporate or governmental litigants" as "upperdog litigants" and "unions,
unincorporated individuals, or groups representing such individuals" as "underdogs." See
Rowland & Todd, supra n. 6, at 178-79 (noting that the authors' analysis employed the
coding scheme suggested by S. Sidney Ulmer, Selecting Casesfor Supreme CourtReview:

An Underdog Model, 72 Am. Political Sci. Rev. 902 (1978)). While my operationalization
of upperdogs is similar, unlike these authors, I include only individuals as underdogs.
Further, as in my previous studies, see Kaheny, supra n. 1, at 145; Kaheny & Rice, supra
n. 3, at 206, I designated these threshold contests with reference to the Original Courts of
Appeals Database's coding of the threshold issue, the appellant and appellee, and the
"initiate" of the appeal. See Original Courts of Appeals Database Documentation, supra n.
24, at 118, 40, 33. Further, I followed steps mentioned in these studies to exclude cases
where this coding would not provide for proper characterization. As in my earlier study,
Kaheny, supra n. 1, at 148 n. 19, I do not consider "criminal" and "prisoner petitioner
cases" here.
40. Cross, supra n. 3, at 186.
41. Id. at 187.
42. Id.
43. Kaheny, supra n. 1,at 131; see also Kaheny & Rice, supran. 3, at 214-15.
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of Appeals Database raising at least one threshold issue across
the five time periods designed to correspond to key Supreme
Court eras."
TABLE

1

PERCENTAGE OF SAMPLE CASES RAISING A THRESHOLD ISSUE
PER CIRCUIT-PERIOD

Circuit

1954-61
(Time 1)

1962-68
(Time 2)

1969-71
(Time 3)

1972-85
(Time 4)

1986-96
(Time 5)

D.C.

16.30

16.19

11.11

24.29

34.55

1st

29.63

18.57

12.22

20.95

29.09

2d

20.74

17.14

16.67

21.90

30.61

3d

17.78

27.62

17.78

29.29

34.85

4th

20.00

15.64

5.62

22.14

28.18

5th

22.22

17.62

10.00

23.04

24.24

6th

17.78

15.71

14.44

17.86

23.03

7th

20.00

19.05

23.33

26.90

27.88

8th

12.59

20.95

17.78

18.57

19.39

9th

16.30

21.43

11.11

24.52

29.70

10th

22.22

20.48

8.89

21.67

24.24

11th

-

-

-

27.73

26.06

(n) for
each
circuit

135

210'

90"

420'"

330

Mean

19.60

19.13

13.55

22.95

27.65

The total number of sample cases for the Fourth Circuit in the second time period is
211.
"The total number of cases for the Fourth Circuit in the third time period is 89.
"*The total number of cases for the Fifth Circuit in the fourth time period is 421, and
for the Eleventh Circuit 119.

As seen in Table 1, the dockets of the various courts
include their fair share of cases with threshold inquiries. When
44. Data from the Eleventh Circuit are available only for the last two time periods of
the study, because it was established in 1981. Thus, for the Eleventh Circuit, the fourth
time period includes only the years 1981-85.
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aggregating the data in this manner, it was not uncommon to

discover that these issues were raised in over twenty percent of
the cases in a particular circuit. Moreover, the general trend
reveals that procedural issues are being raised or considered in a
larger percentage of cases across the periods, with the exception
of the third time period, which marks the early Burger Court.4 5
More specifically, the mean percentage for the first two
time periods hovered around nineteen percent, but increased to
nearly twenty-eight percent by the fifth period of the study, with
a marked increase occurring during the era of the late Burger
Court. The increase continued in the early Rehnquist Court, with
threshold issues being raised in at least twenty percent of the
sample cases in all but one circuit between 1986 and 1996.
Further, there is notable variation in the extent to which
such issues are raised across the circuits and, in the context of a
given court, across these five time periods. As seen in Table 1,
most circuits have experienced some significant fluctuation, at
least at some point, in the number of cases involving threshold
issues on their dockets. There is also significant variation in
these trends within each time period. For instance, in the first

period of the study (1954-61), nearly thirty percent of the First
Circuit's docket raised a threshold issue, while such cases were
not nearly as prevalent on the docket of the Eighth Circuit.
Similarly, in the second period, there was over a ten-point
difference in the percentage of cases raising threshold issues
between the Third Circuit (27.62) and the D.C. (16.19), Fourth
(15.64), and Sixth Circuits (15.71). Similar differences among
the various circuits are seen in the third and fourth periods and,
to some extent, the fifth time period as well.
B. Trends in GrantingAccess
As seen in the previous section, procedural issues of access
45. It is important, of course, to consider that examination across these time periods
produces distinct results from one conducted across each year. See Cross, supra n. 3, at
187. However, differences in the figures reported here as compared to those reported in
Professor Cross's work may also potentially relate to the threshold issues examined.
Professor Cross, for example, lists six threshold variables included in the Original Courts
of Appeals Database. Id. at 186-87. I include all thirteen designations of threshold issues
indicated there. See Original Courts of Appeals Database Documentation, supra n. 24, at
118-25.
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are frequently raised on appeal. The extent to which such issues
are considered in appellate decisions, moreover, varies across
circuits and time. Of potentially more importance, however, is
how circuit judges either apply or interpret the relevant rules.
TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE OF PRo-ACCESS DECISIONS PER CIRCUIT-PERIOD

Circuit

1954-61
(Time 1)
33.33
(18)*
42.11
(38)
34.62
(26)

1962-68
(Time 2)
36.36
(33)
50.00
(38)
40.00
(35)

1969-71
(Time 3)
70.00
(10)
50.00
(10)
40.00
(15)

1972-85
(Time 4)
49.48
(97)
43.90
(82)
51.72
(87)

3d

47.62
(21)

51.72
(58)

37.50
(16)

57.26
(117)

4th

37.04
(27)
44.83
(29)

36.67
(30)
58.33
(36)

0.00
(5)
11.11
(9)

39.08
(87)
43.82
(89)

6th

17.39

30.30

53.85

47.76

1986-96
(Time 5)
39.25
(107)
34.83
(89)
40.40
(99)
40.19
(107)
32.50
(80)
46.58
(73)
40.85

(23)

(33)

(13)

(67)

(71)

48.00

25.00

31.58

50.93

34.48

(25)

(40)

(19)

(108)

(87)

4375

27.27

18.75

40.85

35.48

(16)

(44)

(16)

(71)

(62)

9th

38.10
(21)
53.57
(28)

27.91
(43)
27.50
(40)

30.00
(10)
50.00
(8)

45.83
(96)
62.50
(88)

46.81
(94)
47.22
(72)

11th

-

-

46.67

49.38

(30)
48.87
(1019)

440.61

7th
8th

40.44
Mean(11)
(272)

37.67
(430)

-

36.64
(131)

(81)
(1022)

*The number of cases involving at least one clearly decided threshold question
appears in parentheses.
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As a point of departure in investigating these differences in
access behavior, Table 2, above, shows the percentages of "proaccess" cases in each circuit-period, which are defined as cases
in which the outcomes support a party's right to have the merits
of his or her claim addressed in the district court or on appeal.46
Interestingly, Table 2 reveals significant differences among
the circuits in their tendencies to grant access (i.e., to issue proaccess majority decisions) in the face of a threshold challenge.
For example, when comparing the circuit-period pro-access
percentages to the overall mean percentage for each time period,
one can see that the Fourth Circuit's pro-access percentages are
generally lower than that of the overall mean for each time
period, although the circuit's reported percentage for the second
period is very close to the overall mean. Similarly, a general
tendency to close access might be seen in the Eighth Circuit,
which, with the exception of the first time period, registered proaccess percentages lower than that of the overall mean. On the
flipside, parties wishing to have the merits of their cases
addressed by a court fared better in the Third and Tenth Circuits.
Indeed, the Third Circuit's pro-access percentages were higher
than the overall mean for the first four time periods and about
equal to the mean in the last time period. The Tenth Circuit,
moreover, had higher pro-access percentages than the overall
mean for all but the second time period.
This variation is also seen when comparing the circuits
within each time period. In the first time period, for instance,
threshold issues were raised in a similar number of cases in the
Sixth and Seventh Circuit samples; however, the Seventh Circuit
appeared more likely to grant access, issuing pro-access
decisions in forty-eight percent of the decisions in contrast to the
Sixth Circuit's reported seventeen percent. In the second period,
moreover, the Fifth Circuit considered threshold issues in thirtysix sample cases and granted access in fifty-eight percent of
them, a figure well above the mean for the overall time period
(37.67 percent). On the other hand, the Seventh and the Tenth
Circuits each considered a number of cases raising threshold

46. Outcomes were coded in accordance with Kaheny, supra n. 1, at 141, for those
decisions implicating more than one threshold doctrine.
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issues comparable to that in the Fifth Circuit, but granted access
at the rate of twenty-five and twenty-eight percent, respectively.
In addition, although the third time period of the study
encompasses only three years and, thus, contains fewer cases,
there is still some variation across the circuits. The Fifth Circuit,
which produced more than the average number of pro-access
decisions in the second period, granted access in only eleven
percent of its threshold decisions in the third time period, as
opposed to the First and Tenth Circuits, which granted access in
half of their threshold decisions, or the D.C. Circuit, which
granted access in seventy percent of its threshold cases in the
sample.

Finally, while the total number of cases raising at least one
threshold challenge increases with the longer time periods of the
late Burger Court and the early Rehnquist Court, variation in
access behavior persists. For instance, the Eighth Circuit, whose
pro-access percentages were below the mean percentage in the
second and third periods, continues this pattern in the fourth and
fifth time periods as well, granting access in about forty-one
percent and thirty-five percent of its threshold cases,
respectively. The Third Circuit, conversely, registered proaccess percentages above the mean for the second and third
periods and continued this tendency in the remaining periods as
well, granting access in fifty-seven percent of its threshold
decisions in the late Burger Court era and about forty percent in
the early Rehnquist period, a figure close to the overall mean. In
addition, although the First Circuit's sample for the final period
contained only five fewer cases in which a threshold issue was
clearly decided than that of the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit
granted access more frequently than the First Circuit.
C. PartisanDiferences in Gatekeeping Behavior
It is apparent from this analysis that the percentage of cases
involving threshold challenges varies considerably from circuit
to circuit, as do percentages of pro-access rulings. Though an
exhaustive account of the sources of such variation is beyond the
scope of this article, one possible source involves judicial policy
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preferences.4 7 Thus, we might ask whether there are any basic
partisan differences among federal appellate judges with respect
to threshold rulings beyond the area assessed by Professor
Pierce. In the spirit of the Rowland and Todd analysis, one
should also inquire as to whether such differences are more or
less manifest when the cases involve "disadvantaged" parties.4 8
TABLE

3

PERCENTAGE OF PRO-ACCESS VOTES BY
POLITICAL PARTY OF THE APPOINTING PRESIDENT
Upperdog v.
Upperdog

Upperdog v.
Underdog

Underdog v.
Upperdog

ALL THRESHOLD VOTES
Democrat

49.45% (730)*

55.43% (92)

41.87% (886)

Republican

45.63% (892)

49.18% (122)

35.07% (1018)

Difference**

p=0.0626

p=0.1825

p=0.0012

PROPER-PARTY VOTES
Democrat

45.20% (281)

45.71% (35)

44.81% (424)

Republican

40.30 %(330)

46.34% (41)

35.28% (530)

Difference

p=0.1111

p=0.5219

p=0.0014

PROPER-FORUM VOTES
Democrat

57.70% (305)

72.34% (47)

43.48% (368)

Republican

56.23% (329)

66.13% (62)

46.39% (429)

Difference

p=0 .35 4 4

p=0.2441

p=0.7948

*In each column, number in parentheses = number of votes in which at least one
threshold question in the pertinent category was clearly decided.
**In each category, difference = difference in proportions test (one-tailed).

47. See Pierce, supran. 3, at 1760 (reporting party-based differences in a select area of
standing cases-involving environmental law-decided on appeal).
48. See Rowland & Todd, supra n. 6, at 184.
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To get at these questions, I present in Table 3, above, the
percentage of pro-access votes cast by judges appointed by
Republican and Democratic presidents. Specifically, these votes
are reported across all threshold issues as well as across properparty and proper-forum votes for three types of cases in the
years from 1957 to 1996.
In the context of all threshold votes combined, Table 3
indicates that both Democratic- and Republican-appointed
judges cast pro-access threshold votes less than fifty percent of
the time when upperdogs were squaring off against upperdogs,
though Democratic appointees nearly reached the fifty-percent
mark. Interestingly, the data did not show Republican appointees
to be more flexible in their threshold behavior for upperdog
litigants confronting underdog litigants. Democratic appointees,
however, did register a larger pro-access percentage than
Republican appointees when underdog litigants confronted a
threshold challenge in cases against upperdogs. A one-tailed
difference-of-proportions test supports the hypothesis that
federal appellate judges appointed by Democrats cast a higher
proportion of pro-access votes in this context than those
appointed by Republicans.4 9
As also seen in Table 3, when limiting the analysis to
proper-party votes, judges appointed by Democratic presidents
cast more pro-access votes than Republican appointees when
upperdogs faced a threshold question in their cases against
fellow upperdogs, but this difference was significant only at the
0.1 level. 0 There was no significant difference between these
groups' pro-access percentages in cases in which an upperdog
faced a potential proper-party threshold bar in an action against
an underdog. As reported in Table 3, both groups registered
about a forty-six percent pro-access-vote rate in these types of
cases. 5 Once again, the most striking difference is that between
Democrat and Republican appointees when underdog litigants
faced threshold challenges in cases against upperdogs: Judges
49. See the third column of the "Difference" row in the "All Threshold Votes" section
of Table 3, supra, which indicates that p=.00 12.
50. See the first column of the "Difference" Row in the "Proper-Party Votes" section of
Table 3, supra.
51. See the second column of the "Democrat" and "Republican" rows in the "ProperParty Votes" section of Table 3, supra.
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appointed by Democrats cast pro-access votes almost forty-five
percent of the time in cases involving proper-party questions,
whereas judges appointed by Republican presidents cast proaccess votes about thirty-five percent of the time in cases
involving proper-party questions. 52 A one-tailed difference-ofproportions test further supports the notion that Democratic
appointees cast a higher proportion of pro-access votes than
Republican appointees when underdogs sue upperdogs and
confront a proper-party question.5 3
Partisan differences are far less pronounced in the sample
of proper-forum votes. In this area, for example, there was a less
than two-percentage-point difference in the sample percentage
of pro-access votes cast by the two groups of judges in
upperdog-versus-upperdog cases.54 Moreover, there was not a
particularly strong difference in the voting behavior between
Democratic and Republican appointees when upperdogs sued
underdogs and met a proper-forum challenge.5 5 Further, whereas
the votes of Democratic appointees produced a significantly
higher pro-access percentage in deciding proper-party questions
on behalf of underdog litigants in their contests against
upperdogs, in the context of proper-forum questions, the proaccess percentages of the two cohorts of judges were separated
by only about three percentage points.56
D. PresidentialAppointment and GatekeepingBehavior.
The results in Table 3 thus suggest the existence of some
partisan differences with respect to gatekeeping behavior by
federal appellate judges, and further suggest that they are most
likely a function of differences in judges' treatment of properparty questions. A natural question to ask, therefore, is whether
52. See the third column of the "Democrat" and "Republican" rows in the "ProperParty Votes" section of Table 3, supra, which shows that the number of votes measured for
Democratic appointees was 424 and that for Republican appointees 530.
53. The relevant value here was p=0.0014.
54. See the first column of the "Democrat" and "Republican" rows in the "ProperForum Votes" section of Table 3, supra.
55. See the second column of the "Democrat" and "Republican" rows in the "ProperForum Votes" section of Table 3, supra.
56. See the third column of the "Democrat" and "Republican" rows in the "Proper
Forum Votes" section of Table 3, supra.
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such findings are a function of particular appointment cohorts.
On this point, an earlier analysis of federal district judges is
most helpful, as this investigation of standing decisions
produced some interesting, albeit conditional, findings among
the cohorts examined there. 57
In that study, federal district judges selected by Nixon/Ford
(i.e., appointed and confirmed while Nixon was president as
well as those confirmed after he left office 58 ), Carter, and
Reagan were, at first glance, quite comparable to one another in
their propensity to acknowledge standing. 9 Although the
authors had hypothesized that "Reagan's appointees . . . should

be much more resistant to disputed standing claims than their
brethren appointed by President Carter and somewhat more
resistant than their brethren appointed by President Nixon," 60
such judges, in fact, did not behave in this manner when
upperdogs confronted a potential standing bar.61 Underdogs
though, did experience more difficulty among these judges.61
They had better luck among Carter judges-at least if their
litigation objectives involved "social regulation" as opposed to
"personal remuneration."63 Interestingly, the type of litigant
claims or claimants did not seem to influence the behavior of
Nixon/Ford judges, as "this presidential cohort's most notable
characteristic is its consistency across claimant and dispute
categories."64
While this earlier analsis focused on standing decisions
in federal district courts,
one might expect significant
differences across presidential cohorts in threshold decisions
more generally in the federal courts of appeals. To get at this
possibility, I developed a series of lojistic regression models of
the likelihood of a pro-access vote. 6 The models are tested
57. See Rowland & Todd, supra n. 6, at 180-83.
58. Id. at 177 n. 1.
59. Id. at 180.
60. Id. at 178.

61. Id. at 180-81.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 183.
64. Id. at 184.
65. See generally id.

66. Specifically, the dependent variable in these models is the individual judge's
decision with respect to the threshold challenge raised in the case. It is coded "1" and
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across all threshold votes as well as separately for proper-party
votes and proper-forum votes cast by select presidential cohorts
in the Original Courts of Appeals Database, which includes
sample data through 1996. Moreover, because previous
research 67 indicates that threshold behavior might be contingent
upon the nature of the cases at issue, I again explore such
differences among scenarios suggested by that research,
including upperdog-versus-upperdog cases and those in which
underdogs face a threshold bar when challenging upperdogs. 68
Due to the small number of votes cast by the Ford and Clinton
presidential cohorts in the sample, the analysis of the votes cast
in all threshold decisions is confined to the voting behavior of
the Nixon, Carter, Reagan and Bush I cohorts, with the Carter
cohort as the excluded category. When further divided into the
proper-forum and proper-party votes, moreover, the Bush I
cohort cast too few votes to be included. Thus, the judges
analyzed in the proper-forum and proper-party models include
those appointed by Nixon, Carter, and Reagan, with the Carter
judges selected as the excluded category.
Based on the earlier analysis conducted in the federal
district courts, 69 I do not expect the Reagan cohort in the federal
courts of appeals to be generally less supportive of access than
the other judicial cohorts under all situations. Rather, I
hypothesize that this will occur when underdog litigants face
threshold challenges in cases against upperdogs. In particular, if
the previous findingS70 with respect to the Reagan cohort's
treatment of underdogs can be generalized to the federal
deemed a pro-access vote if the judge finds that a threshold challenge should not limit
consideration of the merits in either the district court or, if applicable, the court of appeals,
and is coded "0" if the vote limits a full hearing on the merits (again, at either level). The
independent variables in each model are dummy variables representing presidential
appointment cohorts (coded "l" if the judge belonged to the presidential cohort and "0" if
the judge did not).
67. See generally Rowland & Todd, supra n. 6.

68. 1 obtained only 103 votes in upperdog v. underdog cases and, thus, even fewer
when dividing the threshold votes into proper-party and proper-forum votes. Thus, the
analysis is run only for votes cast in upperdog v. upperdog and underdog v. upperdog
challenges. Nixon appointee Judge Murray Gurfein of the Second Circuit is treated as a
Nixon judge despite confirmation after Nixon left office, which is consistent with the
convention used in the district-court study. See Rowland & Todd, supra n. 6, at 177.
69. See generally id.

70. Id. at 181.
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appellate context and beyond the issue of standing, one should
expect a negative and statistically significant coefficient on the
Reagan cohort variable in cases in which underdogs encounter
threshold challenges against upperdogs across the combined
sample of all threshold votes and in the more limited samples of
proper-party and proper-forum threshold votes. In addition, it is
also possible that Reagan judges will exhibit greater flexibility
when upperdogs confront procedural access questions in cases
against underdogs or upperdogs and, thus, I expect a positive
and statistically significant coefficient on the Reagan cohort
dummy variable in the models restricted to these particular
cases. I test as well the expectation that the other conservative
judicial cohorts will follow similar tendencies as the Reagan
cohort (that is, relative to the Carter appointees in the sample).
Table 4, which appears on the next page, presents the
results of the appellate-judge-cohort analysis across all threshold
votes. As seen in that table, there are no statistically significant
differences in the threshold decisions of the Nixon and Bush I
cohorts and the Carter cohort when underdogs confront
Reagan
threshold challenges when suing upperdogs.
appointees, however, do appear distinct from those of Carter in
this context. As expected, the sign on the Reagan cohort variable
is negative and is significant at the .01 level. However, contrary
to my expectation, these same patterns were evident in the
model of upperdog-versus-upperdog votes as well. That is,
Reagan appointees were also more likely than the Carter judges
in this model to issue a restrictive access vote in cases that
involved upperdogs confronting upperdogs.

71. There were no cases in Rowland and Todd's data in which standing was a potential
bar for an upperdog opposing an underdog, id. at 179 n. 3, but their findings cast doubt on
the proposition of a negative relationship here. In other words, earlier research suggests
that the Reagan cohort would be unlikely to vote against access in a case in which an
upperdog was suing an underdog.
72. The coefficients on both of the included cohort variables are negative, but they are
not statistically significant.

THRESHOLD DECISIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

275

TABLE 4
A MODEL OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A PRO-ACCESS VOTE
(CARTER JUDGES, EXCLUDED CATEGORY)

ALL

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

Number of Cases

Classified Correctly

Wald Chi Square

THRESHOLD VOTES

UPPERDOG V. UPPERDOG

UNDERDOG V. UPPERDOG

MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD
ESTIMATION*

MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD
ESTIMATION*

-0.1003
(0.2002)

-0.2317
(0.1869)

-0.2879+
(0.1650)

-0.5743***
(0.2182)

-0.0982
(0.3373)

-0.4297
(0.2967)

0.0148
(0.1168)

-0.2634**
(0.1331)

832

1041

53.13%

62.82%

3.12, 3 df,

7.51, 3 df,

prob > X2 = 0.3739

prob > X2 = 0.0574

Robust standard errors clustered by judge are shown in parentheses.
**

p <.05

***p < .01.
*Significant at p <0.05, but sign of coefficient is opposite to that hypothesized.
All tests are one-tailed, with the exception of the intercept.
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To what extent, however, do these findings hold up when
tested separately across the subcategories of threshold issues?
Table 5, which appears on the next page, presents the results of
the model over two subsets of cases-those that raise properparty threshold questions and those that raise proper-forum
threshold questions. Due to the more limited samples, these
analyses are confined to the threshold votes of the Nixon,
Reagan, and Carter cohorts, with the Carter appointees again
serving as the reference category.
As seen in Table 5 on the next page, in the more limited
samples of upperdog-versus-upperdog cases, there are no
statistically significant differences in the threshold voting
behavior of the Nixon and Reagan cohorts and the Carter cohort
across either proper-party or proper-forum votes. The
coefficients of the Nixon and Reagan cohort variables are
negative, but they do not reach conventional levels of statistical
significance. However, as in the previous analysis, cohort effects
emerge when threshold challenges appear in cases pitting
underdogs against upperdogs. In the proper-party context, both
the Nixon- and Reagan-cohort coefficients are negative and
statistically significant. Thus, when the threshold issue raised is
one of standing, ripeness, mootness, or the like, Reagan and
Nixon appointees on the federal courts of appeals tend to be less
likely to grant access to underdogs suing upperdogs than are
Carter appointees.
Such results, however, do not extend to the proper-forum
context. In fact, the coefficients of both the Nixon- and Reagancohort variables are positively signed and are significant in that
direction in the model of underdog-versus-upperdog properforum votes,73 suggesting the existence of pro-access voting on
threshold matters by these cohorts of judges in these properforum cases. Further, there are no statistically significant
differences between the Reagan and Nixon cohorts and the
omitted category, the Carter cohort, when upperdogs sue
upperdogs and encounter a proper-forum challenge.

73. The model itself, however, is significant at about 0.1.
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TABLE 5
A MODEL OF THE LIKELIHOOD OF A PRO-ACCESS VOTE
(CARTER JUDGES, EXCLUDED CATEGORY)

ProperForum

ProperParty

INDEPENDENT

Underdog

Upperdog

V.

V.

V.

Upperdog

Upperdog

Upperdog

Upperdog

MAXIMUMLIKELIHOOD
ESTIMATION*

MAXIMUMLIKELIHOOD
ESTIMATION*

MAXIMUMLIKELIHOOD
ESTIMATION*

MAXIMUMLIKELIHOOD
ESTIMATION*

-0.1586
(0.3016)

-0.5747**
(0.2964)

-0.1038
(0.3260)

0.3722,
(0.2087)

-0.0989
(0.2806)

-0.8189t
(0.2631)

-0.2293
(0.3195)

0.4500,
(0.2520)

-0.2469
(0.1972)

-0.0482
(0.2012)

0.3163
(0.2356)

-0.3996***
(0.1433)

504

279

407

58.13%

62.30%

55.20%

54.05%

0.29, 2 df,
prob > X=

9.83, 2 df,
prob > X2=

0.52, 2 df,
prob > X=

4.58, 2 df,
prob > X=

0.8641

0.0073

0.7707

0.1012

Number of
Cses o320
Cases

Classified
Correctly

Sare
Square
*

Underdog

Upperdog

V.

Robust standard errors clustered by judge are shown in parentheses.

** p <.05

** p <.01

f p<.001

,significant at p <0.05 but sign of coefficient is opposite to that hypothesized
All tests are one-tailed, with the exception of the intercept.

In summary, insofar as these results suggest that the policy
judges for the federal

prerogatives of presidents who select
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courts of appeals can potentially steer these judges' gatekeeping
proclivities, they are in accordance with earlier work on
gatekeeping by federal district judges. 74 Like the Reaganappointed district judges studied earlier, Reagan appointees to
the federal courts of appeals were less willing than Carter
appointees to issue a pro-access threshold vote for an underdog
challenging an upperdog, at least in some circumstances.
Specifically, although this result emerged when all threshold
issues were examined together and when the analysis was
confined to proper-party issues, the Reagan judges in this
sample did not appear to be less willing to provide a pro-access
vote for underdogs relative to the Carter judges when the
threshold vote was on a proper-forum question. In fact, the
results, if anything, suggest the opposite conclusion.
When looking at the other cohorts in the analysis, the
voting behavior of Nixon and Bush I judges was not statistically
different from that of Carter judges in either model including all
threshold votes. In the model of proper-party votes, however,
Nixon judges (like Reagan judges) were more likely than Carter
judges to vote against review of the merits in cases in which
underdogs were challenging upperdogs. However, this behavior
toward underdogs (i.e., individuals) was not apparent when the
threshold issue involved a proper-forum matter.
IV. DIscusSION

Recent studies have highlighted the "important
gatekeeping role" performed by judges on the federal courts of
appeals when determining if a threshold doctrine should
prevent review of a claim on appeal and evaluating whether the
trial court appropriately applied a threshold doctrine. 6 While in
some instances appellate judges will not hold that threshold
rules bar them from hearing a claim, in other cases, they will.
Assessing the number of cases including threshold questions in
the federal courts of appeals and exploring whether threshold
votes reveal any circuit-specific tendencies or reflect the partisan
74. See Rowland & Todd, supran. 6, at 183.
75. Kaheny, supra n. 1, at 153; see also Kaheny & Rice, supran. 3, at 202, 204.
76. Kaheny, supra n. 1, at 130-31, 153; see also Kaheny & Rice, supra n. 3, at 205.
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preferences of the presidents appointing particular judges,
therefore, is a worthwhile task. And despite developments to
further examine these threshold decisions in the literature, basic
descriptive studies have been lacking.
This study offers this type of analysis. Specifically, the
study examines the frequency of gatekeeping decisions in the
federal courts of appeals and investigates whether behavioral
differences might be evident between Democratic and
Republican appointees and among those appointed by select
presidents of both parties. As detailed here with the use of the
Original Courts of Appeals Database, the overall mean
percentage of these types of decisions for each of the five time
periods of the study ranged from about fourteen percent to
twenty-eight percent. In addition, with the exception of the third
time period of the study (1969-7 1), the general trend indicates
that a larger percentage of cases include threshold judgments
over the periods examined here.
The analysis further shows that circuits vary in their
gatekeeping tendencies. For example, with the exception of the
second time period in the sample, in which its pro-access
percentage approached the overall mean, the Fourth Circuit had
a lower pro-access percentage than the overall mean of each
time period. Other circuits, like the Third and Tenth, were
typically more willing-relative to the other circuits-to grant
access when ruling on threshold questions. These trends across
circuits might very well be suggestive of key policy differences,
a finding worthy of future investigation.
In this analysis, I explored partisan sources of variation in
threshold decisionmaking among the judges as well. In
particular, I assessed differences between Democratic and
Republican appointees' gatekeeping behavior across various
types of cases and threshold votes in the federal courts of
appeals. As seen in the analysis, there are some notable
differences between the threshold decisions of Democratic and
Republican appointees in upperdog-versus-upperdog cases as
well as in underdog-versus-upperdog cases. However, while
these differences were apparent when examining all threshold
issues combined and in the category of proper-party cases, they
were not apparent in proper-forum cases.
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In addition to an examination of basic partisan
differences, I also investigated whether there are presidential
cohort differences in appeals-court gatekeeping. Here, as well,
the lesson seems to be that judicial access tendencies are
conditional upon the types of threshold questions at issue and
the nature of the parties before the court. Expectations regarding
Republican appointees' treatment of underdog litigants
challenging upperdogs were supported in a pooled model of all
threshold votes, but a more limited analysis suggests that these
findings are more a function of restrictive access decisions in
what are classified as proper-party concerns.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, this study joins a few others in suggesting
that scholars provide additional assessment of threshold
decisions in the federal courts of appeals.7 7 Many decisions in
the federal courts of appeals involve threshold issues and, as
seen here, there are voting trends in those cases among
Republican and Democratic appointees and among those chosen
by certain presidents. Future scholars should also assess the
impact these votes have on the parties who come before the
federal courts of appeals: Are potential appellants, for example,
responsive to access trends and do they in consequence make
decisions about whether to appeal as a result of access
policies?78 Further, is the Supreme Court an active monitor of
threshold decisions made in the federal courts of appeals, and is
circuit variation in pro-access trends a function of Supreme
Court supervision (or lack thereof)? How do threshold doctrines
operate, moreover, in unpublished cases? 79 Thus, more work
should be done to probe threshold decisions in the federal courts

77. See e.g. Kaheny, supra n. 1,at 153; Kaheny & Rice, supra n. 3, at 222.
78. See Taggart & DeZee, supra n. 2, at 92 (noting that "substantive access issues ...
allow the Supreme Court not only to clear the path leading to the courts but also to erect
barriers to issues they choose not to confront"); see also Atkins & Taggart, supra n. 2, at
377 (suggesting that "[i]t is possible to interpret substantive access rules as regulating the
flow of cases to the federal courts").
79. See Kaheny & Rice, supra n. 3, at 222 (suggesting this as a possible area for future
research).

THRESHOLD DECISIONS IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS

281

of appeals and to examine the effects of those decisions in a
more exhaustive manner.

